41
In this work, we manipulated the reward structure of the interaction so that the action displayed by the two 42 types of learning becomes (respectively not) discriminable, giving a relative strategic (resp. dis)
43
advantage to the participant given the role endorsed during the interaction. We employed a computational 
78
Recently, an emphasis has been placed on one particular feature of this mind reading ability: using the 79 past experience to predict the behavior of a conspecific [3] . Strategic interactions during repeated 80 competitive games have been proven to be a useful experimental paradigm to capture the behavioral 81 dynamics revealing such theory of mind in human and non-human primates [4] . The ability to use the latter to maintain and update, using prediction accuracy, a mental 100 representation of the choice environment has been found to encompass social interactions as well [22] Crucially, all these studies reported important heterogeneity in the level of engagement in belief-based 112 learning, linked to variation in overall performance. However, none of the previous studies directly 113 investigated the relationship between the human's ability to engage in strategic learning and the observed 114 deviation from best response distribution, and ultimately MSNE. Taken together these results yet suggest 115 that humans' propensity to follow optimality prescription from game-theory requires to disengage from 116 reward-oriented, model-free, learning and fully engage in belief-based learning.
118
We hypothesized that, depending on how the reward structure interacts with the MSNE prescription in a 119 repeated strategic game, human performance in the game may be differently affected so that it does not 120 necessarily reflect an individual's general level or ability of strategic learning. Previous studies suggest 121 that the amplitude of the payoffs interferes with the propensity to follow the MSNE [7] , and that the 122 symmetric nature of a game might facilitate the belief formation over the opponent's behavior through 123 perspective taking [29] , [30] .
125
We developed a novel 2x2 competitive game setting, symmetric in payoff amplitude and expected payoff, 126 so that the two players would earn the same if they both follow the MSNE distribution. The structure of the 127 payoff matrix was however designed to lead to strategic asymmetry where one player's highest rewarded 128 action would happen to be, at the informational level, the one the MSNE prescribes to choose the most 129 (advantageous role), while for the other player the attractive action (focal point) would be the one she 130 should choose the less (disadvantageous position). If following the optimal distribution of choice is 131 conditioned on the ability to consider the strategic structure beyond the payoffs value to engage in belief 132 learning, then our game should lead to strategic asymmetry. We made the secondary hypothesis that in 133 the repeated version of this game, humans with different individual strategic learning levels (SL) would 134 differ in their capacity to overcome this asymmetry and lead to observable differences in the final earnings 135 between the advantageous and disadvantageous roles in the game.
137
Sophisticated learning in social competitive interactions 6
We ran 2 distinct experiments with the same game setting: In the first one human subjects play against 138 each other, while in the second we specifically manipulate the level of subjects' computerized opponent.
139
Beforehand, we simulated agents interacting repeatedly through our competitive game, all modeled as 140 simple learning algorithms varying from reward-based to sophisticated belief-based computations [25] 141 and developed to capture different levels of strategic learning sophistication (SL). As anticipated we show 142 that, at the population level, the game payoff matrix lead to a strong strategic asymmetry, such that the 143 agents playing in the disadvantaged position see their loss reduced only when they engage in higher SL 144 level than their opponent. We moreover found that the observed deviation from game optimality (MSNE) The game is a two-by-two (two players, two actions) (payoffs) asymmetric game, with a unique Mixed 162 strategy equilibrium (Fig. 1A) . The expected payoffs at the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium are the same The experimental design remained unchanged: participants were randomly assigned to one of the 2 roles 256 of the same game, with the same trial structure and timing, and also played 2 blocks of 100 trials each.
257
Nevertheless, this time they did not play against another randomly picked human participant, but rather We first tested our hypothesis that our game settings triggers differences in choice behavior between the Fig. 3.A) , but rather to the size of their loss in the 312 interaction (Fig. 3.B) . In fact, the disadvantage in the interaction that was experimentally induced through 313 the structure of the game lead Players 2 to be constrained to the loss domain, so that the closer their 314 choice proportion was to the MSNE, the less difference in points they had with their opponent. This 315 asymmetry in the interaction seems to have been fully exploited by Players 1 since deviation of Players 2 316 from the MSNE lead them to perform better than their counterpart did in this situation (Fig. 3.C -Fig. 
317

S1.C).
319
Before investigating how the level of strategic learning affects the choice behavior of the two roles, we 320 first tested that our prior assumption that subjects differ in their level of strategic learning was met. Our 321 computational analysis revealed that half of our subjects behavior was best captured by the Influence 322 model (Fig. 4.A) , while near one third of our population was best fitted by models of lower level of 323 strategic complexity (less than 10% by the reinforcement learning model). Moreover, not only the subjects 324 best fitted by the Fictitious model were also better captured by the Influence model in comparison to the 325 reinforcement model (relative fit of the Influence) (Fig. 4.B) , but the better a subject's choice behavior was 326 captured by the high SL model, the higher the value of her Influence best fitting parameter λ was (B1 : r = 327 0.7534, p=6.76e-13; B2 : r = 0.7535, p=6.73e-13). Taken together these results reveal that the majority of 328 subjects were engaged in some form of strategic learning throughout a gradient of strategic complexity (Fig. 5.A,B) , their SL level was not 377 correlated directly to the total points won in each block but to the difference in points with their opponent, 378 so that the higher their SL level, the lower their average relative loss is (Fig. 5.A) . Moreover, the higher 379 their SL level was compared to their Player 1 opponent, the closer their action distribution was to the 380 MSNE (Fig. 5.B) . However, this was not enough to overcome the structural disadvantage and increase 381 their absolute performance (Fig. 5.C 
416
so that they got more frequently the high reward when they chose action A (Fig. S4.C) . Conversely this 417 lead Players 1 to compensate, to avoid deviating more from the optimal play, by engaging in higher 418 strategic learning eventually leading to also increase their accuracy (Fig. S4.C) .
419
This overriding of the prime tendency for Players 2 to go for the high reward by engaging in higher level of 420 strategic learning level was also observed from one choice to another. Using a logistic regression 421 analysis we can take a closer look to the series of choices to investigate how the previous actions impact 422 the current decision (details provided in Text S1). This analysis revealed that on average subjects 423 consistently alternated their choices every 2 trials independently of their role (Fig. S5.A) , but that only
424
Players 2 tended to persist in selecting the action linked to the high reward, taking less into account the 425 Sophisticated learning in social competitive interactions 19 opponent's last choice (Fig. S5.A,B) . And the more Players 2 engaged in strategic learning the more they 426 would alternate their choice (Fig. S5.C) .
428
Altogether, our analyses suggest that among the subjects endorsing the role of Player 2 in this 429 experiment, only the ones who had a high level of strategic learning sophistication could detach from the 430 game sub-optimal focal point to overcome the structural disadvantage they had in the game interaction.
431
Their opponent, albeit in the easy position, was then forced to adapt and at the end to follow the Players 
541
We next tested our second hypothesis regarding the specific effect of the opponent on the choice 542 behavior of the subject given the role endorsed in the experiment. As shown in Fig.6 , only Players 1 were 543 affected by the identity of the opponent, exactly as predicted by the simulation (Fig.5.A.B, Fig.S7.A.B) . The present study aimed at testing the prediction that the structure of a repeated game interaction can 578 lead to strategic asymmetry depending on the way it facilitates the engagement in sophisticated learning.
579
More precisely, the hypothesis was that a dissymmetry in the overlap between reward structure and 580 MSNE (even when there is still symmetry in maximum possible payoffs between players) can differently 581 engage human subjects in using sophisticated strategic learning so that their overall performance does 582 not always reflect an individual's general ability of strategic learning or strategic reasoning. 
597
We thus hypothesized that the reward structure of the interaction might affect subjects differently given 598 their capacity to engage in strategic learning, depending on how much best-response to reward-based 599 and belief-based learning overlap. Based on this prediction we developed a 2x2 strategically asymmetric 600 game where the two roles were meant equal (same payoff distribution and expected payoff at MSNE), but 601 in which inequity arises among individuals with different SL levels, from the discrepancy in one role 
670
In contrast, disadvantaged subjects behavior were found to be solely conditioned by their own level of 671 strategic engagement, not the one of their opponent. They also presented much higher consistency 672 across interactions, and evidence of a correlation between working-memory and their SL level was found.
673
Crucially, the role endorsed in the repeated game did not seem to impact the SL level of the subjects in 674 either of our experiments. 
681
In behavioral game theory the concept of bounded rationality broadly assumes that the capacity of the 682 agents to grasp and use all the required information leading to equilibrium are somehow constrained [44] .
683
In this line, a theoretical framework which has accumulated growing support in the past decade has been 684 proposed to explain deviations from optimal choices in static games: level-k models [15] . 
710
It is worth noting that another source of sub-optimality has been suggested in the behavioral economics 711 literature: heterogeneity in best response. It has been proposed that social preferences for instance could 712 bend utility functions [47] . If our study did not allow to directly test this hypothesis, we still observed a 713 higher strategic engagement in advantaged subjects capable of high strategic learning when confronted
